European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
Three legislative recommendations for the European Defence Union
euractiv – The European Commission must move beyond the defence industry to be truly successful in bringing a step-change in European defence, writes Martin Sklenár.
Martin Sklenár is GLOBSEC Distinguished Fellow and former defence minister of Slovakia.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled her nominations for Commissioners and their portfolios in her second term at the helm of the EU executive.
Hearings and confirmations in the European Parliament will take some time, but Europe will appoint its first European defence commissioner. If confirmed, Andrius Kubilius from Lithuania will hold office, from which expectations could not be higher. European citizens expect the EU to be able to act more independently in defence if necessary.
The US has called for a more emancipated Europe in defence for over a decade. And the security situation in Europe following Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine is the worst since the end of World War II.
While all the other European institutions still have a role to play, appointing a dedicated European Commissioner for defence will give the push towards a European Defence Union a strong new impetus and significantly change the playing field.
Based on EU Treaties, the European Commission holds significant powers. It exercises executive power by implementing EU decisions, managing the budget, and ensuring member states appropriately apply EU policies.
The Commission has been using all of those functions to boost the European defence industry, and it should continue to do so, including finding as many resources as possible for building up defence industry capacity.
For the EU to progress on defence and security, however, it is most important that the Commission leverages its strongest weapon—legislative initiative. The right to propose new European laws allows the Commission to shape EU policy across various sectors and to break through years of hesitation on the part of member states.
Even if the EU’s legislative process will be long and iterative, European defence ambitions require the Commission to act ambitiously and decisively.
To make the best use of his mandate, Kubilius should, from the very beginning, focus on three concrete objectives: significant progress on military mobility imposing relevant EU legislation, elimination of export/import licences for transport of defence goods and services on Union’s territory, and revision of EU guidelines for public procurement in defence.
First, bottom-up initiatives in military mobility, such as the PESCO project, have been successful but seem to have reached the limit of added value. A top-down approach could shorten the transport times by requiring EU member states to agree to border crossing requests in less than the current five days, ideally within hours.
It could also introduce a pool of pre-approved forces to move across Europe freely for specific EU and NATO tasks, like exercises.
European legislation aimed at harmonising national procedures and shortening decision times would overcome member states’ dragging feet in moving substantially on mobility and logistics, which are critical not only for European security and defence but mostly as an integral part of NATO’s credible and effective deterrence and defence.
Second, while some progress has been made in boosting the European defence industry through incentives, financial subsidies, and forced multi-nationality of projects, it cannot be described as substantive.
The time is now to apply the benefits of a European single market to defence goods and services. The European Defence Industrial Strategy has been the first step in this direction.
However, to achieve its goals by 2030, that 50% of defence purchases should be made within the EU, and 40% of procurement cases should be done collaboratively, the Commission should simplify the transport of defence articles among EU member states and cut the administrative burden of export and import licencing.
Naturally and rightfully, member states want to retain control over imports and exports of these goods and services into and out of their territory.
They already, however, rely on other member states to enforce their common rules and regulations for all goods and services legally sold in member states. EU legislation could significantly ease the deliveries of new defence equipment across the Union and simplify life-cycle management, maintenance, and spare parts deliveries, potentially leading to cost and, hopefully, price reductions.
Similarly, the new Commission should adjust customs regulations for military equipment from the EU to Ukraine and from Ukraine to the EU. This would facilitate early deliveries of donated military equipment and create more flexible conditions for the repair and maintenance of Ukrainian military equipment on European territory.
Third, defence procurement in the European Union must change. The current set of regulations has served the EU well, but now they need to be brought to the new security environment. In Ukraine, we can observe the necessity of procuring quickly; otherwise, the buyer will not get the best available capability.
Innovation cycles have been shortening well below the average expected time of a single defence procurement case of main military equipment. Therefore, the Commission should embark on a review of the EU’s defence procurement rules to foster innovation, help overcome existing market fragmentation, and strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy.
If confirmed by the European Parliament as the new Commissioner, Kubilius can fully take advantage of all these powers. He will be the one planning out the first mandates of its kind, starting initiatives and programmes to be implemented by several of his successors.
Ambition must be the norm when drawing up the plan for his mandate.
The European Commission must move beyond the defence industry to be truly successful in bringing a step-change in European defence. Von der Leyen’s mission letter to Kubilius is signalling strong motivation to do as much as possible.
