European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
More German weapons for Ukraine? If only the Bundeswehr were better equipped
nzz – Germany’s approach to rearming mirrors a peacetime pace. What must change for the country to meet its responsibilities to the continent?
Things aren’t looking good for Ukraine. Across much of the front line, the Ukrainian army is on the defensive; after more than two and a half years of conflict, many units are exhausted, depleted and losing their effectiveness. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says that he needs 14 new brigades simply to hold the line. For that, he requires more personnel, weaponry, tanks, artillery and ammunition. Once again, he is dependent on the West, especially Germany.
Yet, Berlin’s military aid remains sluggish. The delays stem from insufficient funding and a range of structural hurdles: the Bundeswehr’s ongoing challenges, the limitations of Germany’s arms industry and a procurement process mired in inefficiency.
«If you have Leopard [tanks], then give them to us,» demanded Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the donor conference in Ramstein in January 2023. But what arrived was far from enough to turn the tide against Russian forces.
Germany’s military shortfall: too little left for Ukraine
Military experts like Austrian General Staff officer and war analyst Markus Reisner estimate that Ukraine needs at least 300 additional tanks to form the 14 new brigades required to hold Russian forces at bay. To reclaim all territory occupied by Russia, however, Reisner suggests that Ukraine would need as many as 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.
This is a staggering figure, given the West’s deliveries to date. Just over a year and a half ago, for example, German armed forces handed over 18 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks to Ukraine. That was a small number for Ukraine, but a large number for the Bundeswehr.
After decades of downsizing, the German military is now facing shortages across the board. At the same time, Germany’s expectations and obligations in NATO are growing. In addition to the current nine army brigades, up to six more will be needed in the coming years. Germany therefore needs every tank itself.
For now, the Bundeswehr has little left to send. The shortage extends beyond tanks to other critical weapons systems, equipment and ammunition. Although resupply is underway, the process is moving slowly.
Political choices behind Germany’s military shortages
A recent study by the German Council on Foreign Relations explains the root of the issue: the government is required to repeatedly renegotiate prices for military equipment on the market, complicating any effort to secure a stable supply. Without long-term contracts, defense firms lack the incentive to invest in additional personnel or expand production lines to meet demand.
Adding to the challenge, there is an evident lack of trust between the state and the defense industry. Years ago, German policymakers decided that weapons should not be manufactured for stockpiling; each production run must be tied to a specific order. These rules date back to more peaceful times, when demand was lower and planning horizons were correspondingly longer.
According to the paper by the German Council on Foreign Relations, the German state is an unpredictable partner for the defense industry. This year, investment funds in the regular defense budget ran dry by spring. The industry remains uncertain about upcoming orders or budget allocations for next year.
In response, German arms manufacturers produce only what they expect will be needed in the near term. The consequences are serious: dormant supply chains wither, price quotes lapse, and production lines are either shuttered or repurposed for other clients.
Arms procurement system needs reform
As Europe’s largest economy, Germany bears responsibility for stabilizing the continent’s defense capabilities. To restore functionality to its arms production, German policymakers should consider the following steps:
Security investment program: The current spublic revenue model cannot resolve supply issues. Even with the €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr, the defense budget falls short of funding the necessary modernization of the armed forces. Substantially more spending will be required over the next decade.
New legal framework: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its threats against the West have thrust Germany into an ambiguous zone between peace and conflict. Peacetime restrictions, such as the ban on stockpiling weapons, need legal revisions to reflect this new reality.
Centralized management: Germany should establish an arms coordinator to streamline Bundeswehr needs with NATO allies’ requirements and the industry’s export policies. Ideally, this role would sit within the Chancellery, enabling better oversight of involved ministries (defense, economy, foreign affairs, finance) and swift resource allocation.
Prioritization of quantity: Germany must shift focus from developing the world’s most advanced systems to prioritizing volume. Germany must rely on tried-and-tested systems that can be produced quickly and in large quantities. This would benefit the Bundeswehr, the allies and Ukraine the most.
Trump and China: a new threat to arms supplies
Beyond Berlin’s cautious defense policy, another factor could further threaten Germany and Ukraine’s access to military supplies: the rising hostilities between the U.S. and China, likely to escalate under President Donald Trump. If it comes to a geostrategic conflict, Trump will demand the allegiance of his European partners.
Europe’s reliance on China extends beyond civilian goods to critical military production. Take ammunition, for instance – Europe sources much of the essential nitrocellulose, also known as guncotton, from China, with few affordable alternatives available. Ukraine is not the only country facing substantial dependencies.
