European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
How Europe can save NATO
Atlanticcouncil – President-elect Donald Trump will likely return to office skeptical about NATO’s value and Europe’s contribution to its own security. Officials who worked directly with Trump in his first term are convinced that he has no qualms about reducing or even ending the United States’ commitment to the Alliance. But Trump will again be a transactional president who wants to demonstrate strength.
With the proper initiatives, European allies can save the Alliance. These allies should start by focusing the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague on Europe’s strategic responsibilities, agreeing on ways that Europe can remove some of the United States’ defense burden.
Major European powers are faced with flagging economic growth, weakened leadership, and Ukraine war-weariness. Therefore, much of the leadership burden will fall on new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. He is up to the task. As a former center-right Dutch prime minister, Rutte is known to have a cordial relationship with Trump, and like Trump, he is a dealmaker.
Ukraine will be first on the docket. Trump is pushing for a quick settlement that would probably result in continued Russian occupation of some Ukrainian land. Rutte has already stressed that the United States’ security interests lie in preventing a Russian victory.
Europe should seek to shape Trump’s initiative accordingly. Whatever the terms of a ceasefire, key to lasting peace will be a solid Western commitment to long-term Ukrainian security. That should be Europe’s principal focus. Ideally, that would mean NATO membership for Ukraine.
Europe should encourage that outcome, but Trump may resist. If so, the European Union (EU) could step up by prioritizing Ukrainian EU membership, which includes the somewhat weaker Article 42.7 defense commitment. It should also deploy European troops to Ukraine post-conflict to underscore its pending commitment and pledge to provide the majority of long-term military aid to Kyiv.
The June 2025 NATO Summit itself can celebrate the fact that twenty-three of NATO’s thirty-two countries now meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) defense spending goal. The Alliance needs to encourage the remaining nine to meet that goal soon, but it should also take the next big step.
Chinese military spending—especially on naval assets, missiles, and nuclear weapons—is challenging the United States’ traditional military dominance in East Asia. The United States must respond to maintain deterrence in that region. To help with that, Europe needs to backfill in its own region.
To do this, at its upcoming summit, NATO should agree to raise the 2 percent goal, perhaps to 3 percent of GDP by the end of the decade. Should Trump abandon the United Sates’ NATO commitment, that would present an absolute minimum European defense spending level. But pledging it in advance could keep the United States in the Alliance. Trump could take credit while NATO gets stronger.
Moreover, the new defense spending goal should be targeted on specific defense requirements. One requirement could be the development of adequate European forces to meet the supreme allied commander Europe’s new defense plans for the continent.
A second requirement could be the purchase of enough so-called enablers to meet massive European shortfalls in this area. Such enablers include strategic lift, air-to-air refueling, modern operational intelligence, communications, and command and control. Each of these is essential to credible modern deterrence and, if that fails, to fighting a war. A third requirement should be building additional European naval assets that would allow the United States to swing many of its naval forces to Asia without degrading NATO’s defenses.
Meeting these defense requirements would entail enhanced European defense industrial cooperation and innovation. This would be a job for the EU, but programs should be designed in such a way that US defense firms and their technology are not excluded.
These budgetary steps should be augmented by larger enhanced forward deployment of European troops. Currently, there are NATO enhanced forward deployments in eight of NATO’s frontline countries.
But the size of these forces is generally small—battalion-sized battle groups of about one thousand troops each. Some, like the one in Lithuania, have been upgraded to continuous brigade-sized groups, or up to about five thousand soldiers each. All eight of these should be fully upgraded to the brigade level, provided with long-range artillery and air defenses, and augmented with prepositioned stocks for future reinforcements. The US contribution would be to further upgrade its presence in Poland.
At the global level, the June summit should establish a new division of responsibility among NATO, the EU, and the United States. This could further lighten the US burden. NATO’s prime responsibility would be defense of its treaty area. The EU might take prime responsibility for conflicts to its south, primarily in Africa. Security in the Middle East might be a joint national responsibility with a US lead, as it has been in the Red Sea.
This transatlantic division of strategic responsibility should extend to Asia, with new steps taken at The Hague. Previous summits have moved NATO in this direction, and North Korea’s recent combat role in the Ukraine war further underlines the linkage between European and Asian security. While the United States would bear the principal responsibility of supporting its Asian allies against attack, Europe can do more to enhance deterrence there.
NATO would not extend its Article 5 commitment to Asia. But by continuing Asian participation in NATO summits, creating new NATO liaison offices in Asia, warning China about the dire consequences of invading Taiwan, and participating in more freedom-of-navigation exercises with the United States, European countries can contribute more to the US effort to deter war in Asia.
Eventually, Europe may also need to address the ten-fold nuclear imbalance between Russia and Europe. It was the US strategic nuclear deterrent that kept the peace during the Cold War. Should the United States’ nuclear umbrella be withdrawn from Europe as part of a US withdrawal from NATO, Europe’s two nuclear powers, Britain and France, may need to reconsider their current minimal-deterrent posture. Without the US nuclear umbrella, Europe would be more vulnerable to Russian nuclear blackmail. This is likely to be a back-room discussion at The Hague.
This agenda for The Hague summit is a tall order. This will be especially true if the United Sates and Europe are in a trade war triggered by the new tariffs promised by Trump. But the security stakes are exceedingly high. It’s time for Europe to step up, play the enhanced security role that it should play, and save NATO in the process.
