European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
Europe Racing Against the Clock to Strengthen Defense and Security Capabilities
thesoufancenter – Last Thursday, former Dutch Prime Minister and current NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte underscored the need for citizens of NATO member states to be prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of European security and defense. Currently, seven of NATO’s 32 members still fail to meet the alliance’s defense spending target of two percent of GDP, and it is becoming increasingly clear that a higher benchmark—spending three percent of GDP on defense—will soon be necessary to secure Europe’s future. Some would argue that hitting the threshold is long overdue and that European parsimony on defense has emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin to be more aggressive in the Kremlin’s near abroad, as well as in continued efforts by Moscow to destabilize European countries. Rutte urged European countries to adopt a “wartime mindset” and warned about the dangers of a defense industry “hollowed out by decades of underinvestment,” while at the same time, “Russian arms factories are churning out equipment around the clock.”
While Rutte did not directly address the specific escalating hybrid threats from Russia, which have intensified over the course of the last two years in Europe, he emphasized that although Europe may not be at war, it is far from being at peace. But while Russia remains comfortable operating in the so-called ‘gray zone,’ NATO countries are uncertain, flummoxed by warfare that exists along a spectrum, rather than the binary framing of war versus peace. The growing urgency of European strategic autonomy has been reflected in several recent initiatives. These include discussions between Poland and France about the potential deployment of foreign peacekeepers to Ukraine following a ceasefire, the creation of the new position of European Commissioner for Defense and Space, and the defense planning and spending proposals put forward by Andrius Kubilius, the first appointee to this role. These measures highlight the urgency to strengthen European autonomy for its defense in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia, the war in Ukraine, a NATO-tepid to NATO-skeptic Trump Administration, decades of underinvestment in European defense, and an enduring fragmentation of the European defense industrial base.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently remarked that some cuts to social security will be necessary to secure Europe’s defense, reallocating these funds to investment in military capabilities. For 2024, defense spending within the European Union is projected to reach €326 billion, equivalent to 1.9 percent of the EU’s GDP. This marks a continuation of the upward trend in defense spending among EU countries since 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea shook the EU’s member states awake after decades of underinvestment since the end of the Cold War. While this growth in defense expenditure is encouraging, it also highlights the uneven commitment among European nations to addressing the continent’s security needs. Seven European NATO members – Belgium, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain– still fall short of the alliance’s defense spending benchmark of two percent of GDP. On the other hand, countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Greece are significantly exceeding this target, spending over three percent of their GDP on defense. In many ways, Europe’s eastern flank has become the center of gravity for those countries with the greatest sense of urgency in improving their military capabilities and readiness while strengthening collective defense posture in the face of the threat posed by a revanchist Russia.
Despite this progress, Europe still faces several critical challenges: some members are failing to meet their financial commitments, and much of the defense spending continues to flow outside the EU, undermining the region’s push for true strategic autonomy. While currently, a majority of spending is directed within Europe, a significant improvement from the past, this could shift under a potential second Trump administration. This could paradoxically increase European dependence on U.S. defense equipment despite Trump’s calls for greater European military autonomy. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy might lead to pressure on European allies to purchase more American-made weapons in exchange for continued security guarantees, further entrenching Europe’s reliance on the U.S. defense industry. Additionally, European support for Ukraine risks becoming ineffective if it does not purchase certain U.S. weapons, especially if the incoming Trump Administration cuts aid to Ukraine: The armed forces of Ukraine rely on a host of U.S.-sourced weapons, including ATACMS missiles and HIMARS rocket systems. While European alternatives exist, this again presents the issue of lack of interoperability and efficiency.
The newly appointed European Commissioner for Defense and Space, Andrius Kubilius, the former Lithuanian Prime Minister, started his position at the start of December, and will seek to redress the current security posture of Europe, especially targeting Europe’s fragmented defense industrial base. The Commissioner’s immediate priorities include rapidly accelerating defense spending and establishing a true single market for defense. Collaborative procurement among the member states currently stands at just 18 percent, far below the targeted 35 percent within the European Defence Agency framework. This has far-reaching consequences on European preparedness and agility: multiple versions of the same capability increase costs related to research and development, procurement, and maintenance but also hamper actual European interoperability which will be crucial for joint operations. Initiatives to foster greater cooperation between the member states in defense procurement have started. In November, the European Commission approved €300 million in funding for five cross-border projects to support efficient defense procurement among EU Member States through the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA).
While the overall fragmented nature of Europe’s industrial defense base and the issue of European interoperability take priority, the issue of manpower also needs to be redressed. The International Institute for Strategic Studies assessed that Europe’s armed forces face recruitment and retention challenges, competing with the private sector and struggling with declining demographics and a shrinking pool of potential recruits. The 2024 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence has for the first time acknowledged personnel recruitment and retention as one of the most pressing issues facing Europe’s armed forces. Nonetheless, European-level initiatives to redress this issue have not yet materialized. Former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, tasked by European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen, released a report in October 2024, applying the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ as understood in Finland to the EU level, recommended modernization measures and cultural changes to make a career in the armed forces more appetizing.
While the European Union and its member states are taking significant steps to enhance their defense capabilities and security, the evolving situation in the Ukraine-Russia war and future decisions by the Trump Administration regarding NATO and Ukraine will ultimately determine whether these efforts come in time to ensure the safety of the 27 member countries. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe has been confronted with unprecedented hybrid threats, underscoring the urgency of strengthening its defense posture. In January, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned that Russia could potentially threaten NATO within the next five to eight years. While such a kinetic attack remains unlikely, the need for robust European defense capabilities has never been more critical.
