European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
Trump’s attacks on NATO revive debate over ‘European pillar’ – what does it mean?
euractiv ـ Donald Trump’s slamming of NATO and allies is accelerating discussions about a “European pillar” within the alliance – a concept more than 30 years old that remains undefined.
Since his return to the presidency a year and a half ago, Trump has repeatedly tested the alliance by pushing for higher defence spending, floating US control of Greenland, and criticising allies for not helping to reopen the Strait of Hormuz during the conflict with Iran.
“NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM,” Trump wrote on social media on Wednesday after the alliance’s Secretary General Mark Rutte flew to Washington to defuse tensions.
His remarks, and signals the US may deprioritise Europe’s defence, have revived calls for a stronger European role, or European pillar, within NATO.
First credited to John F. Kennedy in 1962, the idea later appeared in NATO’s 1991 strategic concept, urging European members to take greater responsibility for defence. Decades on, it remains open to interpretation.
European capabilities
France, in its 2025 Strategic Review, for instance, defines it as Europeans having the capabilities to meet their obligations, while being able to “act together independently” for their own defence.
For the US, it has meant Europe contributing more capabilities to common NATO defence while Washington retains control over leadership, military planning and nuclear deterrence, Jamie Shea, a former deputy assistant secretary general at NATO, said.
The European pillar “can be seen as Europeans fulfilling capability targets,” Juraj Majcin, policy analyst for defence and security at the European Policy Centre, said. Europeans still heavily rely on US assets for long-range ballistic missiles, but also space-based targeting and intelligence.
NATO allies agreed in June last year to allocate 5% of their GDP to defence by 2035, after Trump criticised Europeans for not spending enough and relying too heavily on Washington. At the time, the US was still delivering more than 40% of all the capabilities of NATO.
Since then, the EU, to which 23 NATO allies also belong, has agreed to bend fiscal rules and raise money on the markets to plug gaps in nine defence capability areas, spanning drones, ammunition but also maritime and cyber. Working on these gaps supports NATO’s capability goals, and therefore complements the work of the alliance, Slovenia’s defence ministry told Euractiv.
But the US response has been mixed. Americans are asking Europeans to handle their own security, which requires improving Europe’s domestic production capacity. But Washington continues to urge EU countries to procure American equipment, effectively depriving European manufacturers of potential orders and revenue.
“The US cannot have it both ways,” Shea said. “What would have happened if the US cancelled all of its Patriot contracts with Europe because it needs these air defence capabilities itself in the Middle East?”
European decision-making
Another thorny issue is decision-making. NATO was founded after the Second World War on the premise that a US military presence would deter aggression. Decisions are made by consensus at the North Atlantic Council, while a US official serves as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), overseeing defence plans.
“The whole point of NATO is to have Americans being able to fight in Europe with American leadership,” Majcin noted.
But Trump’s criticism has pushed some allies to call for greater independence. France’s defence ministry said last week after being asked about the European pillar of NATO that Europeans “must be capable of making our own decisions”.
For Leonard Schuette, international security programme fellow at Harvard University, the European pillar implies a “rebalancing of NATO’s command structure,” with more Europeans in leadership positions. But it doesn’t mean acting independently from the US within NATO, which would mean changing the very structure of the alliance.
Washington has also sent mixed signals, with NATO envoy Matthew Whitaker suggesting Germany could take the SACEUR role. It is also expected to relinquish its command of NATO forces in Naples and Norfolk, and instead assume leadership over the Maritime Command (MARCOM), one of the alliance’s three core capabilities.
In absolute terms, “the European pillar would mean that Europeans could do things, not only when the US does not want to contribute forces, but also where the US does not agree,” Majcin said. But this remains highly unlikely with an American official at the helm of SACEUR.
Some experts suggest European allies could therefore operate outside of the alliance, in so-called coalitions of the willing, once they have the capabilities to act independently.
“Europeans want to be flexible,” Shea noted, adding that they could develop a defence structure that can work with the US but also operate independently outside NATO, “if the US uses the NATO consensus rule to block Europeans from acting in their own interests.”
Defence ministers of the UK, France, Germany, Poland and Italy, for instance, already meet in a set format.
Trump’s repeated attacks on allies over the Strait of Hormuz have escalated tensions that had barely eased after his threat to take over Greenland, an overseas territory of NATO ally Denmark. His criticism of NATO is set to once again loom large over the alliance’s July summit, originally meant to focus on spending commitments.
European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
