European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
Defence: Europe needs a plan B for NATO
epc.eu ـ Can Europe still count on the United States as an ally? Since no lasting answer can be expected from this administration, Europeans have a duty to organise their security more independently.
Europe has experienced two major security shocks in rapid succession. First came the Greenland shock, when the United States, Europe’s protecting power, threatened an ally. Then came US President Donald Trump’s demand that the very same allies should join the war with Iran that he himself had launched – followed by insults when they showed restraint.
Yet Europeans continue to behave as though they still hold the key to preserving US security guarantees. That is why many heads of government avoid criticising the United States. Anyone who raises the idea of a more European NATO is quickly told not to scare off the Americans or create a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, these are merely conversations Europeans are having with themselves.
Europeanisation is already decided
In reality, the Europeanisation of NATO is settled. From 2027 onward, the United States will provide only 50% of the alliance’s military combat power – significantly less than today. For that reason alone, the question is no longer whether NATO will become more European. It is by which path, and by when.
As defence burdens shift, Europeans will demand a greater say. With that greater political weight comes greater responsibility – externally in relation to Russia, but also internally.
Contingency planning as a responsibility
Given these developments, declarations of commitment to the transatlantic NATO alliance seem less like prudence than intellectual laziness – a reluctance to confront looming uncertainty. But that uncertainty will have to be managed regardless.
Preparing for uncomfortable scenarios is not an anti-American reflex, but a duty of statecraft. No one is trying to push the United States out of NATO. But Europe must insure itself against the possibility that American support may be limited, delayed or politically blocked. That kind of insurance is barely taking place.
Ready for ‘fight tonight’?
This also requires an uncomfortable insight: Europe must not plan only for an orderly transition. It must also reckon with the worst case: how Europe could ‘fight tonight’ – defend itself not at some distant point in the future, but today, without the United States.
Which capabilities are definitely available, which are not, and which are politically or militarily decisive? These questions are unpleasant. But without considering them, debate remains technocratic and underestimates the gravity of the situation.
Political leadership
The challenge of redesigning Europe’s security policy cannot be solved with a procurement list alone. The real gap concerns political and military leadership: who will decide on escalation, priorities, operational command and the distribution of risk? Who will turn political objectives into military options?
Nuclear deterrence poses a particular challenge, since many still want the United States to provide it. As long as Washington offers such guarantees, it will also claim influence over conventional warfare. The more uncertain those guarantees become, the more urgent the question of European leadership. Anyone who talks only about military capabilities without addressing political leadership is treating the symptoms, not the problem.
Balancing intra-European differences
There is also a second shift: the more European NATO becomes, the more important differences within Europe will become. One axis runs from east to west. In the west are the older NATO states, some with strong leadership ambitions but less fear of Russia. In the east, states have massively increased their defence efforts and tend to hold more hawkish views on defending NATO. To avoid civilian casualties, they want to stop a possible Russian attack – on Russian territory.
The other axis runs from north to south. NATO’s northern flank has expanded dramatically with Finland and Sweden, and the threat environment is leading Northern European states to treat the region as a single theatre. In planning and manoeuvres, national borders now play almost no role. The south, by contrast, appears largely untouched by this in security terms. Yet the conflict in the Middle East is once again drawing attention to the vulnerability of Europe’s south-eastern flank.
Both axes will become more politically significant as the Americans lose relative weight. Europeans will then have to negotiate what different risks they are prepared to take in order to deter Russia – and, if necessary, to defend themselves successfully. A more European NATO will be viable only if Europe addresses these differences.
The German question returns
In this intra-European balancing act, one question carries particular historical and geostrategic weight: where does Germany stand? Last year, the chancellor stated his ambition to develop the Bundeswehr into the strongest conventional army in the centre of Europe. But this massive rearmament programme lacks an explicit European dimension that brings allies on board.
This creates a discursive vacuum that others are exploiting. In places such as Paris and Warsaw, nationalists are reviving the image of a resurgent Germany threatening its neighbours. If the German government fails to contest that narrative, it will face unnecessary headwinds in its efforts to strengthen Europe’s defence.
Plan B: Pathways towards a more European NATO
What follows from this?
First, Europe urgently needs an inventory of scenarios involving limited or no American support. What could Europe already do this evening, and how can it improve that capacity quickly? The good news is that Europe can defend itself without the United States – it will simply be less comfortable and initially riskier.
Second, Europeans must organise political and military leadership within NATO instead of waiting for new parallel structures.
Third, European Allies need immediately a protected political space in which governments, militaries and security policy elites can informally discuss paths towards a more European NATO.
Fourth, Europe will remain politically and militarily heterogeneous for the foreseeable future. It must learn to better organise that heterogeneity and perhaps even turn it into a strength. Instead of dreaming of vast fleets and a unified European army, the immediate priority should be to make the interfaces among European armed forces interoperable at speed, especially digital systems. That includes intelligence, command, logistics, targeting processes, maintenance and industrial staying power.
A debate about a more European NATO is not an attack on the alliance. It is a prerequisite for avoiding a deterrence gap. The most dangerous illusion would be to believe that this discussion can – or must – be postponed to spare transatlantic sensitivities or avoid losing control over planning assumptions. NATO will become more European, whether Europe prepares or not. That is precisely why Europe must plan that path now.
European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, Germany & Netherlands – ECCI
